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Abstract 
 
Guest workers have provided a source of agricultural labor supply in many countries.  Recent 
legislative proposals on immigration reform in the United States have renewed discussions about 
the role of guest worker programs, and highlighted the arguments for and against such programs.  
Even within the agricultural sector, there has not been strong broad-based support for an 
expansion in the number of guest workers.  A model is developed that considers competing 
interests between commodity groups (horticulture crops and grain crops) to explain this lack of 
support, and then a series of simulations are conducted to highlight the possible economic effects 
of an expanded guest worker program.  Results suggest that an increase in the labor supply 
would lead to much larger welfare gains for horticultural producers and firms in the supporting 
input markets.  Furthermore, under some conditions, simulation outcomes show how an increase 
in the labor supply may lead to small welfare losses for both producers and input suppliers in 
grain markets. 
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On the political economy of guest worker programs in agriculture 
 
Introduction 
Potential reform in immigration policy has fueled much political debate in the United States 
(Martin 2013); immigration reform also remains a significant policy question in other developed 
countries (Reichert and Massey 1982; Wong 1984; Yamanaka 1993; Castles 2006).  Such 
debates have generally focused on three issues: (1) enforcement against illegal migration, (2) 
development of rules for unauthorized immigrants currently in the host country, and (3) 
administration of guest worker programs.  Guest worker programs allow foreign citizens to 
temporarily reside and work in the host country; they are typically used to employ laborers in 
industries such as agriculture, hospitality, and other industrial sectors that have seasonal 
production patterns.  Guest worker programs in the United States have had a long history and 
have been at the nexus of the recent negotiations surrounding immigration reform (Martin 2002; 
Kim 2014).  
As a result of labor shortages during World War II, the U.S. government began a guest 
worker program known as the Bracero Program which allowed Mexican laborers to enter the 
United States and work in agriculture.  The Program (also referred to as Public Law 78) 
continued until 1964, and at its peak it allowed up to 440,000 guest workers to enter the United 
States per year.  In 1953 the U.S. government began the H-2 Visa Program, a guest worker 
program separate from the Bracero Program that allowed a small number of foreign citizens to 
be employed in the United States for work that was classified as seasonal.  The H-2 Visa 
Program has not been specific to agriculture1, but it has been used to bring temporary workers to 
the United States to work in agriculture and the Program continues to employ approximately 
60,000 guest workers in agriculture in recent years.  At the same time, it is estimated that half of 
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the 1.2 million workers employed in U.S. agriculture are unauthorized (U.S. Department of 
Labor 2005).   
The most recent legislation on immigration in the United States was in 1986; the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 granted legal status for certain unauthorized 
immigrants and increased border surveillance to increase enforcement, but effectively did little to 
the guest worker program (Martin 1994; Thilmany 1996).  Since 1986 there have been several 
legislative attempts to introduce additional reforms; however, none of these legislative proposals 
have become law and there remain an estimated 12 million unauthorized immigrants in the 
United States (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013).  In 2006 the U.S. Senate proposed a 
comprehensive plan targeting enforcement, legalization of unauthorized immigrants, and an 
expansion of the guest worker program.  The 2006 Senate act included AgJobs, or the Blue Card 
Program, which proposed allowing up to 1.5 million unauthorized immigrants to obtain 
immigration status if they engaged in farm work.  In 2013, the U.S. Senate again introduced 
legislation that proposed a broad set of reforms to immigration policy, including an expanded 
guest worker program.  This Senate proposal called for a replacement of the H-2A visa with a W 
visa; under this program there would remain a cap on the total number of visas, but the total 
number of guest workers allowed at any one time would rise to approximately 350,000.  Later in 
2013 the U.S. House proposed a set of so-called piecemeal bills for immigration reform; this 
included the Agricultural Guestworker Act that proposed to replace the H-2A Program with the 
H-2C Program.  The number of visas under the proposed H-2C program would be determined by 
the Secretary of Agriculture, and up to 500,000 visas would be issued per year.   
There are two main criticisms of guest worker programs.  First, labor rights advocates are 
critical of the conditions faced by guest workers, and of potential opportunities for agricultural 
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employers to exploit guest workers.  Second, critics of immigration reform opine that guest 
worker programs provide an avenue for immigrants to enter a country legally but then become 
unauthorized immigrants if they overstay their visa (Basok 2000).  There are also benefits 
associated with guest worker programs.  For immigrants, the benefits may include higher wages, 
and migrant-sending countries may benefit from greater remittances and the return of workers 
who gained skills abroad (Chiswick 1988).  Employers in the migrant-receiving country may 
benefit from the expanded economic output created by the stable and reliable labor force 
supplied by immigrant workers.  Agricultural economists have highlighted the important role 
that immigrant workers have contributed in the production of labor-intensive horticultural crops 
(a category that includes fruit, vegetable, and nursery crops).  In general, research in this arena 
finds that large changes in the supply of foreign-born agricultural workers (through border 
enforcement or guest workers) would have positive impacts in markets for horticultural crops—
some horticultural crops are expected to be impacted more than others—whereas the effects in 
markets for non-horticultural markets are less clear.   
Emerson (2007) notes that technological improvements in agriculture have been biased 
towards labor-intensive crops between 1970 and 2005; this research also suggests that a closed 
border approach would shift the crop mix away from horticultural crops whereas an increase in 
legal migration would have a very limited impact on the crop mix.  Zahniser et al. (2012) 
simulate the implications from two policy scenarios in a general equilibrium model: the first is a 
modest increase in the number of guest workers, and the second is a substantial decrease in the 
number of unauthorized workers in the United States.  Their results show that an increase in the 
number of guest workers by 156,000 would lead to a 1.0 to 2.2% increase in the production of 
horticultural crops, and a 0.1 to 1.5% increase in the production of other (non-horticultural) 
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crops.  When the supply of unauthorized workers is decreased by 5.8 million, their simulation 
results show that horticultural crop production would fall between 2.0 and 5.4% and non-
horticultural crop production would fall between 1.6 and 4.9%.  Gunter, Jarrett, and Duffield 
(1992) find a similar range of results for production of selected horticultural crops with a 10% 
change in the agricultural labor supply.  Calvin and Martin (2010) examine the relationship 
between immigration reform that leads to fewer guest workers, labor costs, and the production of 
key horticultural crops.  They find evidence that a decrease in the supply of guest workers would 
further encourage mechanization among producers of raisins, processing oranges, and baby leaf 
lettuce; it would also increase pressure for consolidation among producers in these industries.  
They also find that labor-intensive, highly traded, and non-mechanized agricultural sectors (such 
as asparagus and apples) would lose export market share, whereas crops with little import 
competition (strawberries and select lettuce crops) would be less affected by an increase in labor 
costs.   
 The current Congressional debate on immigration reform continues without a clear 
consensus on how to proceed with guest worker programs.  As part of this larger debate, many 
stakeholders within the agricultural community would back legislation that would expand the 
labor supply, and this seems reasonable given that many agricultural industries are relatively 
labor-intensive.  However, and perhaps surprisingly, there is not unanimous support across 
agriculture industries for an expansion in the number of guest workers. There are efforts to 
establish a greater coalition of support for immigration reform across agricultural commodity 
groups and across regions, but a large share of the active members in this group represent 
stakeholders from horticultural markets.2   The apparent lack of support from grain and oilseed 
groups suggests that immigration reform is either a non-issue for them, their policy preferences 
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are elsewhere, or that there are complex multiple dimensions of policy at play (Grossman and 
Helpman 2001).  The objective of this paper is to consider the effects of an expanded guest 
worker program for both labor-intensive crops (horticultural crops) and land-intensive crops 
(grains and oilseeds), and for the input markets that serve these two crop categories.  Previous 
work finds that an increase in the agricultural labor supply would lead to producer welfare gains 
for both types of crops, but that the labor-intensive crops would receive a disproportionately 
larger share of the gains (e.g., Zahniser et al. 2012).  Little attention has been paid to the welfare 
effects in the relevant factor markets including land and other capital inputs.  The hypothesis 
here is that, under some conditions, an expansion in the labor supply could lead to small 
decreases in welfare for input suppliers in the markets for land-intensive crops.  I test this 
hypothesis using a series of simulations that assess the implications of an expanded guest worker 
program in a two-output, three-input model.  If an expansion in the number of guest workers has 
the capacity to generate negative welfare effects for stakeholders in input markets for land-
intensive crops, it will help to explain the lack of consensus support for immigration reform 
across the agricultural industry. 
 
Competition among pressure groups within agriculture for political influence 
Others have drawn attention to the differences in policy preferences among agricultural 
stakeholders due to regional and commodity-specific interests, and how this makes it difficult for 
general farm organizations to articulate unambiguous policy preferences (e.g., Barnett and Coble 
2011). Guest worker programs are clearly favored by some commodity organizations, and have 
proven to be a controversial issue for broad-based farm lobbying groups.  As evidence of this, I 
collected information published in 2012 by 41 state-level agricultural lobby groups on their i) 
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crop mix, and ii) volume of text in the publication that focused on labor issues.3  These state-
level policy publications are used to communicate their members’ policy preferences to the 
parent farm lobby organization at the national level.4  In Figure 1, I plot the number of times that 
the word “labor” (or labor-related synonyms) appeared in the text of the policy publication along 
the left vertical axis (shown by the line), and program crop acres5 as a share of total crop acres 
along the right vertical axis (shown by the bars) for the 41 states.  The information in Figure 1 
suggests that states with higher shares of program crop acres are less likely to mention “labor” in 
their policy publication, and this reinforces the anecdotal evidence that the concerns about labor 
supply are not equal across regions.   
 Below I follow and extend work by Becker (1983) to develop a conceptual framework 
that describes the competing interests for political support in agriculture, and that explains the 
lack of consensus across agricultural industries for an expanded guest worker program.  Equation 
(1) shows the per firm redistribution, denoted as R, as a result of lobbying.  I use subscript a to 
represent the agricultural (crops) industry and subscript b to represent non-agricultural industries.  
The redistribution to agriculture is the net redistribution to horticultural crops (h) and grain crops 
(g); Z is the income earned per firm as a result of the redistribution where superscript 0 in the 
initial income level.  Becker (1983) defines the redistribution as a tax to one group and a subsidy 
to another group.  Here I generalize the definition of a redistribution to examine the effects of a 
policy change that has the capacity to impact various groups or industries.  
 
0 0
0
a h g h h g g
b b b
R R R Z Z Z Z
R Z Z
     
   (1) 
Following Becker (1983), the net redistribution transfer to agriculture is set equal to the 
redistribution transfer to the non-agricultural industry.  In equation (2) nc represents the number 
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of firms in industry c, where [ , , ]c h g b , and the functions H, G, and B, are the revenue or cost 
of providing the transfer to the respective industry and include the deadweight costs.   
 ( ) ( ) ( )h h g g b bn H R n G R n B R   (2) 
If it is assumed, for simplicity, that there are no deadweight costs for transfers, so that H(Rh) = 
Rh, G(Rg) = Rg, and B(Rb) = Rb, then total amount of the redistribution to industry c is described 
as being determined by an influence function, denoted by Ic in equation (3).  The influence 
function depends on the political pressure exerted by industry c, denoted as ρc, and by other 
variables in x. 
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 (3) 
For the case of an expansion in the number of guest workers available, I describe the case where 
the influence function is positive for the horticulture industry, negative for the grain industry, and 
negative for the non-agriculture industry.  That is, the redistribution due to an expanded guest 
worker program is hypothesized to have a positive impact for the horticultural industry and a 
negative impact for the grain industry.   
Equation (4) shows that the political pressure exerted by industry c, is a function of nc 
and the total lobbying efforts, denoted by mc, where mc = vcnc and vc is the lobbying resources per 
firm.  The hypothesis that the influence function is negative for the grains industry rests on the 
assumption that vg<0 for some firms.  This assumption implies that some stakeholders in the 
grains industry spend effort lobbying against proposals that support guest worker programs; this 
might be explicit lobbying actions against such proposals or it could encompass more implicit 
actions that favor other issues that compete for the attention of policy makers.   
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 ( , ), where [ , , ]c c c c cf n v n c h g b    (4) 
The framework presented above outlines a conceptual model that can be used to examine 
competition between interest groups within agriculture, and provides some structure to consider 
the likely economic effects of an expanded guest worker program across agricultural industries.     
This conceptual model extends work by Becker (1983) to show that although there may be 
potential net benefits to the agricultural industry from an expanded guest worker program, it is 
possible that not all subsectors within agriculture will benefit from such a policy change.  In the 
next section I develop a simple simulation model to assess the implications that an expanded 
guest worker program might have on markets for horticultural crops and grains crops, and on the 
factor markets that supply inputs to both crops.  The purpose of the simulation exercise is to test 
the hypothesis that an increase in the number of guest workers may have negative welfare effects 
for suppliers of inputs to the grains market.  In addition, the simulation model provides a useful 
tool to better understand the conditions under which a negative welfare change is likely to occur.   
 
Simulation model 
Following Muth (1964), Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) and Sumner, Lee, and Hallstrom 
(1999) I develop a multimarket simulation model to understand the implications of an expansion 
in the number of guest workers available to U.S. crop agriculture.  The model includes supply 
and demand functions for two crop markets, horticultural crops (denoted with subscript h) and 
grain crops (denoted with subscript g).  Crop agriculture is treated as a separable group in the 
analysis, and in some simulations I allow for imperfect substitutability in consumption between 
the two crop markets.6   Three input markets are also included in the model as factors in the 
production of the two crops; the three inputs include labor (denoted with subscript l), land 
(denoted with subscript d), and other capital inputs (denoted with subscript r).   
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 The primary motivation here is to study the general economic effects of a policy 
change—that would lead to a small increase in the labor supply—in the domestic markets for the 
two aggregate crop categories and the three inputs.  Such a policy change is expected to have 
effects in international markets if there was substantial trade in the crop markets or in the input 
markets.  However, including international trade would add some complexity to a multimarket 
model with broad crop categories, and it is not clear that the international trade effects can be 
captured in a meaningful way in the stylized model proposed below.  The purpose of the 
simulation model is to understand if an increase in the number of guest workers has the capacity 
to negatively affect any domestic stakeholders as a way to explain the lack of support for 
immigration reform across all domestic agricultural industries.  Including trade in crops or inputs 
is not expected to provide any additional insight on this central question.  Therefore, in the model 
presented next, I assume that there is no trade in crops, and use Qi to describe both domestic 
consumption and domestic production of crop i, where [ , ]i h g .  I also assume that there is no 
trade in input markets following similar assumptions often used by agricultural economists that 
employ multimarket simulation models.   
The basic structure of the simulation model is given in equations (5) through (9).   
Equation (5) represents market demand for crop i and it is shown to be a function of a vector of 
crop prices, denoted as p, and an exogenous variable that affects demand for crop i, denoted Ai.  
Equation (6) represents the derived demand for input k, where [ , , ]k l d r , in the production of 
crop i, and w is a vector of input prices; this assumes that there is a well-defined cost function for 
each of the two crop categories, denoted as ( )iC  in equation (6).  Equation (7) represents the 
market supply of input k which is a function of the price of input k, denoted as wk and an 
exogenous variable that affects the supply of input k, denoted as Bk.  Equation (8) is the 
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equilibrium condition in the input markets.  Equation (9) is the market clearing condition in the 
output markets assuming perfect competition and assuming production is equal to consumption.    
 ( ;A )i i iQ f p  (5) 
 ( , )i iki
k
C Qx
w
 
w  (6) 
 ( ;B )k k k kX f w  (7) 
 k ki
i
X x  (8) 
 ( , )i ii
i
C Qp
Q
 
w  (9) 
Totally differentiating equations (5) through (9) and converting them to elasticity form 
yields the simulation model shown below.  Because the model is partial equilibrium in nature, 
aggregate income and prices of commodities outside of crop agriculture remain constant 
throughout the adjustment process.  In equations (10) through (14), equilibrium adjustments in 
prices and quantities are simulated by exogenously specifying a relative increase in the supply of 
agricultural labor via the parameter βk.  These simulated changes in prices and quantities are 
subsequently used to calculate the corresponding changes in producer revenue.  In the following 
equations, for any variable z, zˆ represents the relative change in z, that is, zˆ represents dz/z where 
d refers to a total differential.   
 ˆ ˆη ( α )i ij j i
j
Q p   (10) 
 ˆˆ ˆγ σi iki n kn n i
n
x w Q   (11) 
 ˆ ˆε ( + β )k k k kX w  (12) 
11 
 
 ˆ ˆλik k ki
i
X x  (13) 
 ˆ ˆγii k k
k
p w  (14) 
Equation (10) describes the relationship between changes in prices of crops (where j 
includes all crops) and the demand for crop i; here ηij is the demand elasticity of crop i with 
respect to the price of crop j.  Equation (10) also includes the parameter αi to allow for a shock 
representing a relative increase in the demand for crop i.  Equation (11) outlines the multimarket 
relationship used to describe changes in the derived demand for input k used to produce crop i.  
Here the parameter γin represents the cost share of input n (where n includes all inputs) in the 
production of crop i and parameter σ ikn is the Allen elasticity of substitution between inputs k and 
n.   Equation (12) shows the relationship between changes in the total supply of input k and the 
supply elasticity for input k; equation (12) also includes the parameter βk as a shock that leads to 
a relative increase in the supply of input k.  The supply elasticity for input k is denoted as εk in 
equations (12).  Equation (13) shows that the change in the total supply of factor k is the sum of 
changes in the derived demands for the input across all crops; each derived demand change is 
weighted by λ ik , the industry share of input k used in in the production of crop i.  Equation (14) 
shows that the change in the price for crop i is equal to the sum of changes in prices for all inputs 
used to produce crop i weighted by the input cost shares.   
The linear transformation framework adopted here is convenient as an approximation but 
none of the results hinge on this simplification.  Equations (10) through (14) do not involve any 
explicit or implicit assumptions about the functional forms used, and it is not necessarily 
assumed that the elasticities are constant.  However, it is assumed that the supply-and-demand 
functions are approximately linear at the initial point of market equilibrium (Alston, Norton, and 
Pardey 1995).  Because the solutions to the logarithmic transformation depend on the parameters 
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selected to characterize the elasticities and share parameters, the next section provides 
information about each parameter used in the model. 
 
Parameterization of the model  
The parameters used here are based on empirical estimates from the literature, similar parameters 
used in other research, and data supplied by industry sources.  Overall, the range of parameters 
used should be interpreted as those in the intermediate run (three to five years) as that seems to 
be the appropriate time horizon to consider for this type of policy change.  It is expected that the 
quantity effects of an expanded guest worker program might be larger and the price effects 
smaller if a longer time horizon were considered.  That is, with more time to adjust, farms and 
input suppliers would be more able to shift resources within these industries in response to a 
change in the supply of seasonal agricultural workers.  A summary of the parameters used in the 
simulation model are presented in Table 1, and each is discussed in detail below. 
The own-price elasticity of demand for horticultural crops is set at -1.2, and for grain 
crops it is set equal to -0.6. These values are slightly more elastic than the estimates for similar 
crops in Huang and Lin (2000), but this analysis considers a longer time horizon.  The values 
selected here fall within the range estimated in the literature and are summarized in Okrent and 
Alston (2011).  Two values for the cross-price elasticities of demand between the crop categories 
are considered in the analysis; in the baseline results this parameter is set equal to zero and 
subsequent simulations examine how modest substitution between the crops affects the results by 
setting the parameter equal to 0.2.  The supply function for the two crops is derived from supply 
functions in the factor input markets.  The supply functions in the factor input markets apply to 
that market as a whole, but reflect the supply decisions made by individual firms in that market.  
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The model assumes that these input markets are competitive, that is, the prices of the inputs used 
are exogenous to individual firms in the crop markets.  Overall, it is expected that the elasticity 
of supply of the inputs—notably for labor and land—is relatively inelastic in response to a policy 
change that would increase the number of guest workers.  The supply elasticity for labor is set 
equal to 0.2, for land it is set equal to 0.2, and for other inputs it is set equal to 1.0 (Sumner, Lee, 
Hallstrom 2009).  The Allen input substitution elasticities are initially set equal to zero, but the 
sensitivity of results to this parameter is also explored with additional simulations.  Subsequent 
analysis also considers the economic effects when the input substitution elasticities are set equal 
to 1.0. 
The simulation model also requires information to describe input cost shares and industry 
use shares.  Input cost shares define the relative contribution of each input towards the total cost 
of producing each crop.  For horticultural crops, labor is well documented as the largest cost 
category and its cost share is assigned as 50%; other inputs are assigned 30% of the total 
production costs and land is assigned 20% of the total production costs.  For grain crops, 60% of 
the total costs are for land, 30% are for other inputs, and 10% is for labor.  Industry use shares 
define how each input is allocated across the two crops.  For labor, 80% of the use share is 
assigned to horticultural crops and 20% is assigned to grain crops.  Land use shares are reversed 
for the two crops; 10% of the land use share is assigned to horticultural crops and 90% is 
assigned to grain crops.  Lastly, for other inputs, 30% of the use is assigned to horticultural crops 
and 70% is assigned to grain crops.  The share parameters used in the analysis serve as 
approximate values, but overall are reflective of the cost structure and the industry usage of 
inputs in these two broad crop categories.  Furthermore, some additional sensitivity work shows 
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that the results reported next are not very sensitive to small changes in the share parameters 
described in this section.   
 
Results and discussion 
The results for four simulations that consider the economic effects of a 10% increase in the 
supply of agricultural labor are reported.  The first set of results is calculated using the baseline 
set of parameters reported in Table 1, and then three additional sets of results are presented that 
outline how sensitive the baseline results are to alternative parameter assumptions.  Each 
simulation imposes a policy shock to the system of equations and generates new equilibrium 
prices and quantities in the markets for the two crops and the three inputs.  The primary purpose 
of the simulation exercise is to shed some new light on the effects of an expanded guest worker 
program for agricultural producers and owners of the key inputs that supply agricultural 
producers.  Therefore, the simulated changes in prices and quantities are used to calculate 
approximate changes in total revenue in each market.  The percentage change in total revenue for 
producers in each market is calculated as the sum of the percentage changes in price and 
quantity.  This approximation was a simplification, however, it allowed for a comparison of the 
change in total revenue across the simulation experiments.  Such a policy change is also expected 
to have impacts on consumers in these markets, but changes in consumer welfare cannot be 
properly assessed within the framework used here.  As a result, changes in consumer surplus are 
not provided in the results presented next.       
The results in Table 2 outline the baseline results for a 10% increase in the total 
agricultural labor supply.  Here the change in the quantity of horticultural crops is 8.4% and the 
change in the quantity of grain crops is -0.4%; the change in total revenue for horticultural crops 
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is 1.4% and it is 0.2% for grain crops and these values are generally reflective of what earlier 
research has shown.  Because fixed factor proportions (i.e., the input elasticities are set equal to 
zero) are assumed in the baseline model, the changes in quantities in input markets are equal to 
the changes in quantities in the crop markets. Changes in the total revenue to owners of the labor 
input falls for both crops; it falls by -8.5% for labor used to produce horticultural crops and by -
17.3% for labor used to produce grain crops.  For owners of the land input and the other input, 
the change in total revenue is positive, yet it is substantially more positive for the inputs that 
supply the horticultural crops.  The change in total revenue increases by 10.7% for land used to 
produce horticultural crops and by 1.9% for land used to produce grain crops.  A similar result is 
found for the other input market; the change in total revenue increases by 11.7% for other inputs 
used to produce horticultural crops and by 2.9% for other inputs used to produce grain crops.   
A sensitivity analysis is conducted that examines how the results are impacted by greater 
substitution across crops and between inputs.  In Table 3 I report results for three simulations: 
the first includes non-zero cross price elasticities of demand for the horticultural crop and the 
grain crop, the second considers non-zero input substitution elasticities between the three inputs, 
and the third considers both substitution effects.  The results in the first sensitivity analysis show 
that adding some substitution in demand between crops does not impact the baseline results for 
horticultural crops in a substantial way, but it does lead to some important differences in the 
effects in the grain market.  Here the change in total revenue for grains is negative as is the 
change in total revenue for owners of the land input; the change in total revenue for grains is -
1.85% and the change in total revenue to the owners of land supplying the grain market is -0.8%.  
Compared to the baseline results, the total revenue to owners of the other input supplying the 
grain market falls, but it remains positive.  In the second sensitivity analysis the assumption of 
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fixed factor proportions is relaxed; this also impacts the results, and it has relatively important 
effects in the grain market.  Here the results show that there is a small negative change in the 
total revenue for grain crops; the change in total revenue for horticultural crops remains close to 
that reported in the baseline results.  In addition, the results in the second sensitivity analysis 
show that the total revenue is negative for all three input markets supplying the grain market.  In 
reality, it is likely that there is some substitution between inputs in agriculture, and therefore the 
results from the second sensitivity analysis may be the most reflective of how an increase in 
labor supply will affect agricultural crop markets and the supporting input markets.  In the third 
sensitivity analysis the change in total revenue for horticultural crops remains positive at 1.0% 
but is less than what was reported in the baseline results, and that the change in total revenue for 
grain crops is -3.3%.  Again, the results show a negative change in total revenue for producers of 
all three inputs supplying the grain market.   
 
Industry and policy implications 
The U.S. Congress has engaged in a long history of political debate surrounding immigration 
policy, and agricultural interests have been actively involved in these discussions given their 
interest in finding a reliable and qualified supply of farm labor.  The most recent changes in U.S. 
immigration policy, in 1986, introduced various reform measures but these did little to the way 
the guest worker program functioned.  Since 1986, several legislative bills on immigration 
reform have been proposed, and in each case policy makers have spent considerable effort 
evaluating possible changes in the guest worker program.  But the guest worker program that 
continues to exist employs a relatively small number of immigrants and, as a result, there are a 
significant number of unauthorized immigrants working in agriculture with a large share working 
on fruit and vegetable farms.  Many stakeholders in U.S. horticultural industries have voiced 
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strong support for an expansion in the number of guest workers and have documented how labor 
shortages affect their businesses. However, support for an expanded guest worker program is not 
omnipresent within the larger immigration reform debate, and it appears that there is not even 
broad-based support for an expanded guest worker program across all agricultural industries.  
 Earlier research has largely found that an expansion in agricultural labor supply will 
benefit horticultural industries.  There is less research examining how additional labor might 
affect non-horticultural industries, and very little research that examines the effects in the 
upstream markets.  This research fills these voids by simulating the likely effects of an expanded 
guest worker program for producers of horticultural crops and grain crops, and for the factors of 
production that support these industries.  We extend the model introduced in Becker (1983) and 
apply it in a series of simulation experiments to explore the conditions under which an expanded 
guest worker program may decrease welfare for grain producers or reduce welfare for the firms 
that supply inputs to the grain industry.   
Three key findings emerge from the simulation results.  First, an expansion in the 
agricultural labor supply does lead to disproportionally larger benefits to producers of 
horticultural crops and to the firms that supply inputs to the horticultural industry.  Second, 
allowing for substitution between crops or between inputs has the capacity to generate negative 
economic effects for producers of grain crops and for firms that supply inputs to the grains 
industry; allowing substitution between crops or between inputs has relatively little impact on the 
effects in the horticultural markets.  Third, of the three input markets included in the analysis, the 
labor market is most affected by a change in the supply of agricultural labor.  Yet, relative to the 
baseline results, the markets for the land input and the other input are most affected once 
substitution is allowed between crops or between inputs.  Overall, the simulated effects in the 
horticultural crop market and in the labor market are robust across the various models; the 
18 
 
simulated effects in the grain crop market and in the other input markets are most sensitive to the 
substitution parameters.   
This research presents a careful analysis of how an expansion in the number of guest 
workers may affect producers of horticultural crops and grain crops, and the suppliers of inputs 
to the two crops.  I employ a simple but novel framework to study these effects and to test the 
hypothesis that an expansion in the number of guest workers could lead to some negative effects 
within agricultural markets.  The results show some evidence that an increase in the agricultural 
labor supply could decrease the production of grain crops and decrease the total revenue for 
producers of grain crops; it could also lead to decreases in the supply of inputs used to produce 
grain crops.  These findings suggest that an expanded guest worker program will not necessarily 
be universally beneficial to all agricultural producers, and that there may be economic reasons 
for the reluctance of support for guest worker programs across agricultural industries.  The 
debate on immigration reform in the United States involves many stakeholders beyond 
agriculture, and there certainly exist larger political economy issues in these negotiations.  
However, it appears that there may also be valid reasons for competition among pressure groups 
within agriculture for political support, and that increasing the agricultural labor supply is an 
issue that does not draw strong support from all agricultural industries.  Although the lack of 
consensus within agriculture on this issue is not the primary impediment on immigration reform 
in the United States, it may be one of the contributing factors to the absence of any legislative 
action that would introduce changes to the guest worker program.    
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Endnotes 
1 The H-2 program was formally divided into two programs in 1986; the H-2A program is 
specific to agriculture and the H-2B program is used to fill non-farm jobs related to landscaping 
(for resorts, hotels, and golf courses). 
 
2 The agricultural organization that is most often associated with advocacy for immigration 
reform is the Agriculture Workforce Coalition (the member list for the Coalition can be found at 
http://www.agworkforcecoalition.org/about-awc/awc-members/). 
 
3 A few of the state-level policy publications were available online, and for those that were not 
available, I requested a copy via personal communication.  I am missing data for nine states (that 
are not included in Figure 1) as they had strict policies that did not allow them to share their 
policy publication with non-members.  
 
4 The parent lobby organization only engaged in explicit policy preferences for immigration 
reform starting in 2013, and is now an active member of the Agriculture Workforce Coalition. 
 
5 Program crops are defined as crops for which federal support programs are available to 
producers, including wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats, extra-long staple and upland 
cotton, rice, oilseeds, peanuts, and sugar (USDA-ERS 2012). 
 
6 A larger agricultural labor supply may be utilized by employers in both crop and animal 
agriculture; however, because guest worker programs have traditionally been used to hire 
seasonal employees the analysis focuses on crop agriculture.   
  
20 
 
References 
 
Alston, J.M., G.W. Norton, and P.G. Pardey. 1995. Science Under Scarcity: Principles and 
Practice for Agricultural Research Evaluation and Priority Setting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Barnett, B.J., and K.H. Coble. 2011. “Understanding regional differences in farm policy 
preferences.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94(2): 528–534. 
 
Basok, T. 2000. “He came, he saw, he … stayed.  Guest worker programmes and the issue of 
non-return.” International Migration 38(2): 215–238. 
 
Becker, G.S. 1983. “A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3): 371–400. 
 
Calvin, L., and P. Martin. 2010. “The U.S. produce industry and labor: Facing the future in a 
global economy.” USDA-ERS, Washington, DC. Economic Research Report No. 106. 
 
Castles, S. 2006. “Guestworkers in Europe: A resurrection?” International Migration Review 
40(4): 741–766. 
 
Chiswick, B.R. 1988. “Illegal immigration and immigration control.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 2(3): 101–115. 
 
Emerson, R.D. 2007. “Agricultural labor markets and immigration.” Choices 22(1): 57–66. 
 
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 2001. Special Interest Politics.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
 
Gunter, L.F., J.C. Jarrett, and J.A. Duffield. 1992. “Effect of U.S. immigration reform on labor-
intensive agricultural commodities.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74(4): 897–
906.	
 
Huang, K.S., and B.H. Lin. Estimation of Food Demand and Nutrient Elasticities from 
Household Survey Data. Technical Bulletin 1887. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service, Food and Rural Economic Division, 2000. 
 
Kim, S.M. 2014. “Immigrations reform’s other hurdle.” Politico, February 5, 2014.  Available at: 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/immigration-reform-house-republicans-103182.html 
 
Martin, P.L. 1994. “Good intentions gone awry: IRCA and U.S. Agriculture.” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 534(1): 44–57.   
 
Martin, P.L. 2002. “Mexican workers and U.S. agriculture: The revolving door.” International 
Migration Review 36(4): 1124–1142. 
 
 
21 
 
Martin, P.L. 2013.  “Immigration and farm labor: Policy options and consequences.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 95(2): 470–475. 
 
Muth, R.F. 1964. “The derived demand curve for a productive factor and the industry supply 
curve.” Oxford Economic Papers 16(2): 221–234. 
 
Okrent, A.M., and J.M. Alston. Demand for Food in the United States: A Review of the 
Literature, Evaluation of Previous Estimates and Presentation of New Estimates of Demand. 
Berkeley, CA: Giannini  Foundation of Agricultural Economics Monograph 48. 2011. Available 
at: http://giannini.ucop.edu/Monographs/48-FoodDemand.pdf 
 
Passel, J.S., D. Cohn, and A. Gonzalez-Barrera. 2013. “Population Decline of Unauthorized 
Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed.” Pew Research Center. Available at: 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/09/Unauthorized-Sept-2013-FINAL.pdf 
 
Reichert, J.S., and D.S. Massey. 1982. “Guestworker programs: Evidence from Europe and the 
United States and some implications for U.S. policy.” Population Research and Policy Review 
1(1): 1–17. 
 
Sumner, D.A., H. Lee, and D.G. Hallstrom. 1999.  “Implications of trade reform for agricultural 
markets in northeast Asia: A Korean example.” Agricultural Economics 21(3): 309–322. 
 
Thilmany, D.D. 1996. “FLC usage among California growers under IRCA: An empirical 
analysis of farm labor market risk management.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
78(4): 946–960. 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS). 2012. 
Farm and Commodity Policy Glossary. Available at:  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/glossary.aspx 
 
United States Department of Labor. 2005. “Findings from the National Agricultural Workers 
Survey (NAWS) 2001 – 2002: A demographic and employment profile of United States farm 
workers.” U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Office of 
Programmatic Policy, Washington, DC.  Research Report No. 9.  Available at: 
http://www.doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf 
 
Wong, L.T. 1984. “Canada’s guestworkers: Some comparisons of temporary workers in Europe 
and North America.” International Migration Review 18(1): 85–98. 
 
Yamanaka, K. 1993. “New immigration policy and unskilled foreign workers in Japan.” Pacific 
Affairs 66(1): 72–90. 
 
Zahniser, S., T. Hertz, P. Dixon, and M. Rimmer. 2012. “The potential impact of changes in 
immigration policy on U.S. agriculture and the market for hired farm labor: A simulation 
analysis.” USDA-ERS, Washington, DC. Economic Research Report No. 135.  
 
22 
 
Figure 1. Share of acreage devoted to program crops and attention given to labor issues by state-level lobbying efforts, 2012 
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Table 1. Parameters used in the simulation model 
 
Parameter description Parameter 
Notation 
Parameter values  
(alternative values shown in parentheses) 
Horticultural crops Grain crops
Demand elasticity  
Own price ηii -1.2 -0.6
Cross price a ηij 0 (0.2) 0 (0.2)
  
Supply elasticity  
Labor εl 0.2 0.2
Land εd 0.2 0.2
Other inputs εr 1.0 1.0
   
Input substitution elasticity b   
Labor/land σld 0 (1) 0 (1)
Labor/Other inputs σlr 0 (1) 0 (1)
Land/Other inputs σdr 0 (1) 0 (1)
  
Input cost shares  
Labor γl 0.5 0.1
Land γd 0.2 0.6
Other inputs γr 0.3 0.3
   
Industry use shares  
Labor  λl 0.8 0.2
Land λd 0.1 0.9
Other inputs λr 0.3 0.7
 
a The baseline results are calculated with the cross price elasticities set equal to zero. 
 
b The baseline results are calculated with all input substitution elasticites set equal to zero. 
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Table 2. Baseline simulation results for a 10% increase in labor supply 
 
Simulated changes in: Horticultural crops Grain crops 
 —Percentage changes— 
Crop markets   
Price -6.98 0.70 
Quantity 8.38 -0.42 
Total Revenue 1.40 0.28 
   
Input markets   
Labor   
Price -16.89 -16.89 
Quantity 8.38 -0.42 
Total Revenue -8.51 -17.31 
Land   
Price 2.31 2.31 
Quantity 8.38 -0.42 
Total Revenue 10.69 1.89 
Other inputs   
Price 3.33 3.33 
Quantity 8.38 -0.42 
Total Revenue 11.71 2.91 
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Table 3.  Additional results for a 10% increase in labor supply under alternative parameter assumptions 
 
 
 
Simulated changes in: 
Including cross-price elasticities 
between cropsa 
Including input substitution 
elasticities between all inputsb 
Including cross-price elasticities 
and input substitution elasticitiesa,b 
Horticultural crops Grain crops Horticultural crops Grain crops Horticultural crops Grain crops
 —Percentage changes—  
Crop markets      
Price -7.41 -0.91 -7.34 -1.81 -8.80 -3.95
Quantity 8.71 -0.93 8.80 1.09 9.77 0.61
Total Revenue 1.30 -1.85 1.47 -0.73 0.97 -3.34
       
Input markets       
Labor       
Price -16.10 -16.10 -14.47 -14.47 -15.96 -15.96
Quantity 8.71 -0.93 8.70 0.72 8.95 -1.75
Total Revenue -7.39 -17.03 -5.77 -13.75 -7.01 -17.70
Land       
Price 0.15 0.15 -0.67 -0.67 -3.83 -3.83
Quantity 8.71 -0.93 1.60 -0.33 1.74 -1.04
Total Revenue 8.86 -0.79 0.93 -0.99 -2.09 -4.87
Other inputs       
Price 2.03 2.03 0.11 0.11 -0.20 -0.20
Quantity 8.71 -0.93 1.43 -0.76 1.03 -3.28
Total Revenue 10.74 1.09 1.54 -0.65 0.83 -3.48
  
a These results are calculated with the cross price elasticities set equal to 0.2. 
 
b These results are calculated with all input substitution elasticites set equal to 1.0. 
 

